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NOTES AND COMMENTS
participate in major extracurricular activities unless he maintains a B
average in his Law School work.
LAw SCHOOL NEEDS
The present Library collection is hardly more than an ordinary work-
ing unit. It is not yet adequate for research and investigation of Uni-
versity calibre. To the end that these minimum facilities may be ade-
quately expanded, an endowment is required which, in addition to state
appropriations for maintenance, will yield $2,500 a year for new books.
The Library is now confronted with a serious shortage of available
space for expansion. When the Law Building was constructed, twelve
years ago, arrangements were made for the housing of 25,000 volumes.
We are now 7,000 volumes in excess of our capacity. We face ihe
immediate necessity of converting a room in the basement, not connected
with the present Library, into library service with special supervision.
In the very near future we must plan for an addition to the building to
house not only the expanding Library but to furnish also much needed
seminar rooms and office space for research workers.
The amount of public work which the School is called upon to do is
constantly growing. More research assistance is imperative. And
scholarships and fellowships are vitally necessary if, in competition with
other University Law Schools, we are to have in our student body the
ablest students from the best Southern colleges.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Bankruptcy-Distribution of Property Held by the Entirety
upon Bankruptcy of One or Both Spouses.
Husband and wife were adjudicated bankrupts on the same day,
and each listed all his property as held by the entireties. Nine days
prior to the adjudication, a creditor who held a joint obligation against
both spouses secured a joint judgment against them. Subsequently the
bankruptcy proceedings of both husband and wife were consolidated
by order of the court, but two days before consolidation the judgment
creditor petitioned for execution against all the property of both bank-
rupts. Held, the estate by the entirety passed to the trustee since by
consolidation he represented both husband and wife, and the joint judg-
ment was a preference which should not prevail against the trustee.'
'In re Utz, 7 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1934).
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It is generally held that the creditors of an individual spouse cannot
reach the estate by the entirety2 for the reason that each spouse owns
the whole and to allow the debts of either to be satisfied out of the
estate would in effect be permitting one person's property to be taken
for the debts of another.3 A joint judgment against both spouses, how-
ever, can reach the estate, since they mutually own the property, and it
should be liable for their joint obligations.4 The Bankruptcy Act gives
to the trustee the right of- a judgment creditor holding an execution
returned unsatisfied.6 Thus a trustee in bankruptcy representing the
husband and wife stands in the position of a creditor who holds a
joint judgment unsatisfied against both spouses, and such trustee should
be vested 'with the property held by the entirety. A judgment against
an individua obtained within four months before he becomes a bank-
rupt (and while he is insolvent) constitutes a preference and such judg-
ment cannot prevail against the trustee settling the bankrupt's estate.0
The same rule should apply where a joint judgment against both
spouses, constituting a lien on the estate by the entirety, has been se-
cured within four months before the legal entity of husband and wife
is adjudicated bankrupt. The result of the instant case to the effect
'A judgment against one spouse is not even a lien on the estate. Hood v.
Mercer, 150 N. C. 699, 64 S. E. 897 (1909). Such judgment will not prevent
husband and wife, acting jointly, from passing good title to the estate. Winchester-
Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 199. N. C. 709, 155 S. E. 611 (1930).
'A. Hufel's Son v. Getty, 200 Fed. 939 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1924); Southern Dis-
tributing Co. v. Carraway, 189 N. C. 420, 127 S. E. 427 (1925) ; Note (1925) 35
A. L. R. 147. But see: Zubler v. Porter, 98 N. J. L. 444, 120 Atl. 194 (1923)(A purchaser of the interest of one spouse at an execution sale procured the land
as a tenant in common with the other spouse subject to the right of survivorship
of either spouse. The Court declared that in New Jersey an estate by the en-
tirety was the same as a tenancy in common with the right of survivorship at-
tached); Marcum v. Marcum, 177 Ky. 186, 197 S. W. 655 (1917) (A purchaser
of the interest of one at an execution sale received only that part of the estate as
was proportionate to the portion of the purchase price paid by that particular
spouse).
At common law the husband was entitled to the whole usufruct of the
estate, and some courts held that this interest could be taken for his debts, Hall
v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670 (1877); Bennett v. Cheld, 19 Wis. 362 (1865). The
Married Women's Acts, however, in many jurisdictions took away the husband's
common-law; right to the usufruct, and this is given as an additional reason for
,not allowing the estate or the income to be taken for the husband's debs. Otto
F. Stiffet's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918);
Notes (1925) 35 A. L. R. 147, (1925) 9 MINr. L. REV. 673, (1931) 29 Mxcn. L.
REv. 778. In North Carolina the husband retains his common-law right to all
the usufruct, but this income cannot be taken for his debts. Davis v. Bass, 188
N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
' Sharpe v. Baker, 51 Ind. App. 547, 96 N. E. 627 (1911) ; Sanford v. Bertau,
204 Mich. 244, 169 N. W. 880 (1918) ; Martin v. Lewis, 187 N. C. 473, 122 S. E.
180 (1924); Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 155.
11 U. S. C. A. §75 (a) 2 (1927) ; Imperial Assurance Co. v. Livingston, 49 F.(2d) 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
11 U. S. C. A. §96 (b) (1927); Benjihnin v. Chandler, 143 Fed. 217 (M. D.
Pa. 1905) ; Moore v. John H. Smith and Sons, 205 Fed. 431 (W. D. N. Y. 1913).
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that the trustee in his dual capacity was vested with the property held
by the entirety, and that a joint judgment obtained within four months
constituted a preference is logically correct.7
A joint creditor is faced with a different problem when only one
spouse (say the husband) goes bankrupt. Where the joint creditor has
not secured a judgment before the husband's discharge in bankruptcy,
it is generally held that he cannot get a joint judgment after the dis-
charge since the husband's debts have been stricken out and only the
wife remains liable on the obligation.8  The joint creditor is then un-
able to reach the estate by the entirety since the obligation he holds is
against only one spouse,9 and the only way he may protect himself
against such loss is to go promptly into the federal court before the
husband's discharge and ask that the discharge be withheld until he,
the joint creditor, can secure in the state court a joint judgment which
will be a lien on the estate by the entirety.1° Such judgment may be
satisfied out of the estate by the entirety after the husband's discharge."1
The courts raise no question as to a preference in this situation.12 This
seems correct since the trustee in bankruptcy has no access to the estate
by the entirety.
The result of the principal case gives rise to the practical problem
of distribution among creditors of an estate by the entirety in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. In the solution of this problem an apt analogy
might be drawn between an estate by the entirety and property held by
a partnership. 13 Where a partnership and the individual partners are
bankrupt at the same time, the funds of the partnership go first to pay
the debts of the partnership, and if there is any surplus, it is divided
7Only one case has been found dealing with this problem. In that case
husband and wife were declared bankrupt on same day and X was made trustee
for each individually, but no consolidation took place. Held, that X was not vested
with property held iby the entireties. Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107, 18 S. W.
(2d) 388 (1929) commented on (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 312.
'Wharton v. Citizen's Bank, 223 Mo. App. 236, 15 S. W. (2d) 860 (1929);
'Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 1235.
'Supra note 3.
" Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Wharton v.
Citizen's Bank, 223 Mo. App. 236, 15 S. W. (2d) 860 (1929). Contra: Edwards
v. Pethick, 250 Mich. 315, 230 N. W. 186 (1930).
'u See Frey v. McGaw, 127 Md. 23, 95 At1. 960 (1915) (A judgment was
secured before husband went bankrupt and was satisfied after his discharge,
but it was not necessary for the creditor to go into court and ask that the dis-
charge be withheld as he had procured the judgment before bankruptcy pro-
ceedings were begun).
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931). But see Ades
v. Chaplin, 132 Md. 66, 193 Ad. 94 (1918) (Joint judgment secured within four
months before husband was adjudicated a bankrupt was set aside as a preference.
This seems wrong since the trustee could not reach the estate by the entirety).
" An estate by the entirety and property held by partnership have been said to
present analogous situations in bankruptcy. Dickey v. Thompson, 323 Mo. 107,
18 S. W. (2d) 388 (1929).
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between the estates of the partners. 14 By analogy the estate by the
entirety should go first to pay the joint creditors. In some jurisdictions
where the estate by the entirety is not recognized in personalty received
from sale of realty held by entireties, 15 it is suggested that the surplus
should be divided' 6 between the estates of the spouses for payment of
the individual debts. The surplus, however, in other jurisdictions
would still be held by the entireties. 17 In these jurisdictions the trustee
of the estate of the individual spouse would not be vested with any part
of the surplus since a judgment creditor of the individual spouse could
not reach it,8 and the trustee has no more right than such creditor.' 9
The suggested distribution would protect joint creditors who make
loans believing they will be satisfied out of the estate by the entirety
and would allow the surplus to be used, when the law permits, in pay-
ment of the debts of the individual spouses.
ROBERT BOOTH.
Bankruptcy-Jurisdiction of Court Under 1933 Amendments.
A decision which will prove to be of unusual interest' to the profes-
sion, and of far-reaching importance, 2 is that of the Circuit Court of
Appeals in In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company.3
The railway company filed its petition in the Northern District of
Illinois for reorganization under the new Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act.4 More than four months prior to the filing of the petition, the rail-
way company had borrowed an aggregate of more than $17,000,000 from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, two New York banks, two Illi-
11 U. S. C. A. §23 (f) (1927) ; Crawford v. Sternberg, 220 Fed. 73 (C. C
A. 8th, 1915) ; Titus v. Mawell, 281 Fed. 433 (C. C. A. 6th, 1922).
'Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. REv. 256.
"Division might be made (1) by giving each estate a proportional part of
the surplus according to the portion each spouse paid of the purchase price; or
(2) by allotting one half of the surplus to each estate. The effect of this would
be to consider as a gift to one spouse by the other any amount in excess of one
half of the purchase price which the latter paid. See Arnold v. Lang, 11 F. (2d)
630 (E. D. Mo. 1926).
n Note (1935) 13 N. C. L. Rxv.
'Hill Top Savings and Trust Co. v. Worley, 16 Pa. Dist. 250 (1906).
Cullom v. Kearns, 8 F. (2d) 437 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
Certiorari has been granted by the Supreme Court of the United States.
'See note 5 infra.
372 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
4 11 U. S. C. A. §205 (1934 Supp.). For a general discussion of this Section,
see Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads under the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 1
U. oF CHIac. L. Rxv. 71; Hanna, Recent Additions to the Bankruptcy Act (1933)
1 GEO. WASH. L. Rzv. 448; Richter. Recent Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act
(1933) 8 NoTRE DAmE LAWY. 460; Rodgers and Groom, Reorganization of
Railroad Corporations under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL.
L. REv. 571; Weiner, Reorganization under Sectioi4 77: A Comment (1933) 33
COL. L. Rxv. 834; Wilson, Railroad Reorganization under Section 77 of the
Bankruptcy Act (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 665.
